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This collection of essays brings together scholars from various disciplinary
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applied to international relations. They investigate how complex systems
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for the study of international affairs. Two important threads link all
the contributions: (i) To which extent is this approach promising to
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understand global governance dynamics? (ii) How can this be imple-
mented in practice?
Keywords: Complex systems, global governance
Introduction
AM A N D I N E OR S I N I
Université Saint-Louis – Bruxelles
PH I L I P P E LE PR E S T R E
Université Laval
That we live in an age of complexity and transition is hardly news. Ours is the age
of interconnections, ambiguity, and uncertainty; of the diffusion of authority; of
various kinds of revolutions: military, technological, social, political, economic, and
even philosophical. What springs from these developments is the feeling of a lack of
control. Decision-makers either think they have no other option but to act as they do
or are paralyzed by the uncertainties and conflicting pressures they face. The usual
solution is to try to reassert control, which leads to new problems. Paradoxically, as
our tools to make sense of and control societies and our environment increase, our
ability to do so diminishes.
One major reason of this state of affairs lies in the difficulty of going beyond
the analytical thinking approach that has served us so well to investigate complex-
ity. Complexity indeed lies in opposition to classical analytical thinking. To illustrate
this shift of perspective, complexity scholars distinguish between the “complex” and
the merely “complicated.” (Morin 1990) Something “complicated,” such as a jet en-
gine, can be approached by cutting it down into manageable parts. Complex prob-
lems, on the other hand, cannot be reduced or simplified without being strongly
altered or “mutilated,” and their behavior is not predictable from the study of their
parts (Morin 1990). Hospitals’ emergency units, terrorist organizations’ networks,
or wild bee colonies are typical complex systems.
Much recent work attempts to show the limits of current thinking and the need
to forego the prevailing doxa that confuses coordination with control and ignores
whole developments in the study of international governance that point to different
dynamics. Even though a spate of books, special issues, and articles have eloquently
made the case for “embracing complexity” (Boulton, Allen, and Bowman 2015),
international relations (IR) scholars have been slow to do so. The profession uses
the vocabulary but either forgets the supporting reasoning or rejects it outright as
a potential paradigm of IR.
In practice though, scholars have increasingly turned their attention to the prob-
lems raised by the behavior of complex systems, notably through models of cooper-
ation, network analysis, the study of regime complexes and boundary-organizations,
or multiscalar governance. In many ways, research largely follows the development
of instruments of governance that de facto respond to the challenge of steering a
complex system. Intellectually though, the prevailing discourse, both in academia
and in politics, remains steeped in analytical linear thinking that emphasizes cen-
tralized authority and prediction. This is the case in most classical IR theories, such
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this schizophrenia more evident than in the analyses and comments surrounding
the twenty-first Conference of the Parties to the climate change negotiations. Pre-
vailing representations were centered on the role of major emitters for the adoption
of a strong intergovernmental agreement, while the actual dynamics within the ne-
gotiations overcame traditional state politics to include a bottom-up evolutionary
approach to climate change commitments (see also the contributions below).
To be sure, the interest in conceptualizing complexity is not new. IR theorists have
been looking at complexity at least since the late 1990s. Since Jervis’ 1997 book and
Harrison’s edited book in 2006, authors have amply demonstrated the potential
usefulness of this approach and suggested ways in which it could alter our thinking
and advance systemic approaches (e.g., Bousquet and Curtis 2011). Nevertheless, it
has yet to fulfill its promises and be widely used. Kavalski’s (2007) characterization
of the emergence of a fifth debate sounds today more like wishful thinking than
a description of a movement under way. Yet, the current search for new models of
international governance, away from a centralized perspective, forces us to take a
harder look both at the promises and at the limitations of models based on complex
systems.
One difficulty lies in separating the characteristics of a complex system (how
do we recognize it?) from its properties (how does it behave and with what con-
sequences?). Too many definitions confuse causes (the characteristics) with con-
sequences (the properties) and prevent us from asking questions regarding which
characteristics of the system lead to what kind of properties (Le Prestre 2017). More-
over, complexity “theory” is diverse, and there is no monolithic complexity science.
It corresponds to a set of approaches, rather than one coherent theory, used to ana-
lyze complex systems. While variants of complexity thinking differ in terms of their
ontological and epistemological orientations on how to analyze complex systems
(see Byrne and Callaghan 2014), all proponents agree on a few basic character-
istics and properties of such systems, the phenomenon rather than the analytical
approach (derived from physics or biology, for example), serving as the federating
element.
In this forum we build on former attempts of conceptualization (notably
Bousquet and Curtis 2011, 51) and define complex systems as open systems—that is,
exchanging information with their environment—that include multiple elements
(units) of various types intricately interconnected with one another and operating
at various levels. This means that political issues are interconnected in a multiscalar
and networked world, although there is unpredictability about which issues may be
coupled and to what extent. Complex systems provide a potentially innovative per-
spective on global governance in that they allow studying governance systems at an
aggregate level, these systems being aggregations of regulations, institutions, rules,
actors, norms, and decision-making procedures in various combinations.
Complex systems display unique properties. A first property is self-organization,
meaning that order does not rely on a clear authority but on the system itself and
on its multiple interactions. Uneven nonlinear interactions among units create mul-
tiple feedback loops that lead to a range of possible outcomes. Positive feedbacks
can readily emerge from unit interactions with each other and with the system that
might magnify small causes into large effects. In complex social systems, the range
of possible paths toward equilibria, or equifinality, is extensive, since issues are not
merely technical but also normative and political. Regime complexes can be con-
sidered examples of self-organized structures in a given issue-area (see Alter and
Meunier 2009, 15; Orsini et al. 2013).
A second property, emergence, is at the core of the notion of complex systems
and of what makes them particularly interesting. Emergence is usually referred to
as systemic unexpected outcomes, illustrated by the expression that “the whole is
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(1997) points out, the sum is not only greater but most of all different. Unexpected
patterns, processes, or properties arise from interactions among the elements of the
system.
Finally, a third property, adaptation, refers to the potential capacity of units to
learn from and coevolve with their environment. Units coevolve and affect the
system, which in turn affects their capacity for coevolution. Adaptation or the
failure thereof takes place at the unit level, but evolution is a systemic property
that may, for example, be characterized by the disappearance of certain units, as
when successful specialization impedes adaptation to changing circumstances. In
a sense, the expression “complex adaptive systems” (Miller and Page 2007) is a
misnomer. Units adopt strategies of adaptation that may or may not be successful
but which, nevertheless, lead to the evolution of the system as other units react to
them. Whether the result is “adaptive” depends on the distribution of preferences
among units regarding desirable outcomes, such as agreement on common goals
and adoption of synergistic policies.
Each of these properties and their degree of achievement induce contradictory
dynamics. First, while complex systems might seem chaotic, as a result of multiplic-
ity and feedback loops, self-organization and adaptation mean that they also know
phases of continuity in the form of: equilibrium when no unit has an incentive to
change the rules; stability as the maintenance of these rules over time in the face
of disruption; and resilience as the capacity to return to a stable state that may or
may not be different from the initial one. Just as certain ecosystems can be constant
and persistent thanks to uneven disruptive events such as forest fires, complex sys-
tems constantly regenerate themselves after destabilizing situations or evolve into
new ever more complex systems. Second, like other systems, complex systems might
be subject to path dependency, but they also regularly present surprises and unex-
pected outcomes. They may also become dysfunctional if there is no coevolution or
even crash after having reached a tipping point. Complexity science, therefore, lies
in opposition to classical analytical thinking and simple system theory. Relationships
are key to understanding (unexpected) behavior.
Beyond its heuristic value, to be useful, the approach itself has to be operational-
ized (Young 2017). How can complex systems thinking facilitate a policy-oriented
agenda? How can we reconcile what takes place at different levels of governance,
and how can we foster synergies among them? Are standard computational ap-
proaches feasible? Many approaches to contemporary international governance re-
flect an adaptation to complexity, such as insisting on local participation in order to
address potential nonlinear effects (Clemens 2013) or promoting a dialectical con-
struction of the science-policy interface. These developments are conceived outside
a complex intellectual framework, however. Rather, they seek to respond to specific
problems and are appended to linear frameworks. Yet, we have de facto entered the
complexity era. The issue is how governance should be conceived with regards to
complex systems. The very notion of governance, as articulated in IR, addresses the
need to cooperate in solving common problems in the context of a fragmentation
of authority and multiplication of actors. Thinking in terms of complex systems can
help us identify the contours of a more relevant global international governance
system.
This is precisely the aim of this collection of essays, which brings together schol-
ars from various disciplinary backgrounds, based on three continents, with different
theoretical and methodological interests but all active in the topic of complex sys-
tems as applied to international governance. They investigate how complex systems
have been and can be applied in practice and what differences it makes for the study
of international governance. Two important threads link all the contributions: (i)
To what extent does the complex systems approach offer a promising path toward
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practice? The forum starts with three general contributions that retrace the histor-
ical account of the links between complex systems thinking and IR (Peter Haas),
suggest a middle-ground approach to adapting complexity approaches to IR (Malte
Brosig), and explain how global governance can be studied as a complex system
(Philipp Pattberg and Oscar Widerberg). The following two contributions (Jean-
Frédéric Morin and Laura Gomez-Mera; Neil Harrison and Robert Geyer) present
detailed case studies on international trade and climate change governance, re-
spectively. The last contribution (David Chandler) comes back to the main lessons
drawn from the forum and engages in a reflexive discussion on the added value
of a complexity perspective. Overall, thinking in terms of complex systems invites
us to give up on prediction, to dissociate management from control, to be attuned
to unintended consequences, and to rethink the role of power. The world is not a
machine, for better or for worse.
IR Encounters Complexity
PE T E R M. HA A S
University of Massachusetts Amherst
Complexity is a structural condition of world politics. It provides the ontology
behind challenging current research questions. It has been most deeply studied
through research on international environmental politics, global change, and the
Anthropocene (Crutzen 2003; Biermann 2014). International environmental poli-
tics scholars were some of the earliest to describe and understand the broader im-
plications of complexity, in part because of the affinity between ecosystem dynamics
and complexity. Moreover, they were among the first to recognize the interconnec-
tions between physical and social systems and to study the broader dynamics by
which complex global relations are understood and governed.
Complexity involves interconnections between separate areas of activity. While
international environmental politics has taken the form of studying how the physi-
cal environment and the social environment interact (Choucri 1993) and interna-
tional political economy studies have focused on the globalization of economic ac-
tivities (Maddison 2007), complexity studies have merged and complemented both,
through our understanding of how economic factors contribute to global environ-
mental disruption (or protection) and the role of global economic activities in a
broader context of social, cultural, and ideational globalization.
The recognition and articulation of complexity are rooted in early twentieth cen-
tury quantum physics (Kern 2003; Wendt 2015). At its core, complexity identifies
a set of properties that shape world politics after increasing globalization. Com-
plexity in world politics is therefore generally regarded as a twentieth century phe-
nomenon and as really taking off post-WW2. There are more actors and types of
actors than ever before, spanning states, multinational corporations, nongovern-
mental organizations (NGOs), international organizations (IOs), and expert com-
munities. More issues are on the international agenda, and they are increasingly
causally interconnected. Domestic politics and IR are increasingly intertwined. Few
shared international norms inform IR, as the post-WWII liberal consensus is increas-
ingly contested (Held et al. 1999; Haas and Hird 2012, preface; Hale, Held, and
Young 2013).
While international regimes were widely created after WWII to deal with discrete
issues, they progressively failed to recognize or capture the interconnections among
them (Mazower 2012; Hale, Held, and Young 2013). To the extent that governance
efforts have continued to focus on isolated issues, political constituencies have be-
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governance arrangements around their interconnections. Scholars who continue to
discretely study individual regimes run the risk of reifying the fiction of fully decom-
posable and disjointed global governance, as well as failing to study the dynamics by
which regimes are partially coupled with one another and change occurs.
Many of the analytic features of complexity have also been identified by work on
wicked problems (Rittel and Webber 1973) and super wicked problems (Levin et
al. 2012). Issues are coupled, although there is uncertainty about the extent of their
coupling and with which other issues coupling occurs. Slow change may accumu-
late with runaway effects, by which time effective responses are impossible, such as
with climate change. There is no single source of authority responsible for govern-
ing these issues or capturing their interconnections. Unanticipated consequences
of actions are common, and surprises are frequent features of world politics. Thus,
there is a disconnect between actors’ intended consequences and actual outcomes.
Moreover, the technical dimensions of issues cannot be disentangled from norma-
tive considerations. Consider sustainability. There are multiple possible equilibria
for sustainable consumption: the question is how are consumption decisions to
be distributed between and within countries. Should everyone be equal, and how
should such changes in practices be awarded (Freeman and Jahoda 1978; Agarwal
and Narain 1991)?
Robert Jervis (1997) also identified the system effects of complexity in terms of
increased uncertainty by decision makers about the nature of the policy environ-
ment, their own choices, and the consequences of those choices. Under such cir-
cumstances, decision makers operate in a condition of ignorance rather than un-
certainty and thus cannot resort to the standard heuristics of insurance and other
ways of handling uncertainty (Knight 1921; Iida 1993).
Furthermore, complexity introduced a new level of analysis for IR. Beyond Waltz’s
three images (1954), complexity introduced a higher order level within which social
relations at the international level occur. This is why systems theorists applied sim-
ilar concepts to that of complexity to study international relations. Morton Kaplan
introduced the study of systems theory as a framework and epistemology for world
politics research (Kaplan 1957). Oran Young was an early adopter of systems theory
to study complex international systems (Young 1968). The research problematique
raised by general systems theory is of a set of tightly coupled, irreducible natural
and social systems. More generally this ecological view focuses attention on global
ecological systems, international political (and social and economic) systems, and
their interplay.
Complex systems are more than complicated. Because there are multiple factors
and pathways influencing conditions in both social and natural systems, causal anal-
ysis is fundamentally overdetermined. Explanations of interesting phenomena re-
quire attention to multiple potential causes and interconnections between various
forces. Confirmation, validation, and reproduction are often difficult. In particular,
because complex systems are often in flux and have emergent autopoetic quali-
ties, it is impossible to reproduce results because the system itself may be constantly
changing. Thus, deductive theorizing is extremely difficult. Many authors prefer
instead to describe what they deem to be salient transformative systemic processes
(Homer-Dixon 1996; Young 2010).
Yet this systems approach is unsatisfying for understanding the dynamics of re-
sponding to complexity and its governance. With a single system for analysis, there
is no variation, and it is difficult to establish the boundary conditions for various so-
cial mechanisms and subsystems. The big view is of a self-correcting global system,
where all of the underlying subsystems are mutually constitutive. In such a concep-
tion, understanding the sources of change is illusive; change and self-reflection is es-
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occur? This gives rise to the paradox of how can a system that gives rise to such po-
tential instability also be self-correcting? And if it is not self-correcting, what can
be done? At best, using complexity theory as a way to understand the governance
of complexity is a deceptive metaphor. Indeed, Earnest and Rosenau (2006, 147)
trenchantly observe that “the paradigm of complexity holds greater sway than the
theory does.” While the implications of complexity for the study of international
governance have proven to be illusive, much recent work has focused instead on
how complexity is governed.
Currently, most IR scholars study ways by which liberal governance can transcend
the original discrete liberal institutions by recognizing the functional interconnec-
tions in the international political system and designing or making use of the wide
array of overlapping institutional arrangements for those issues. Studies of regime
complexes and of orchestration provide a plausible framework for one dynamic by
which governance linkages between complex issues are forged. Regime complexes
exist for most regimes and create opportunities for policy innovation and strength-
ened governance, although they can lead to fragmentation and regulatory races to
the bottom as well (Raustiala and Victor 2004; Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Alter
and Meunier 2009; Gehring and Oberthür 2009; Keohane and Victor 2011; Van
de Graaf 2013; Zürn and Faude 2013). The orchestration literature documents the
extensive proliferation of joint governance efforts between nonstate actors, coordi-
nated by IOs (Abbott and Snidal 2009; Abbott, Green, and Keohane 2016). Because
of the multiple institutions involved in these complexes, they provide the where-
withal for entrepreneurial actors to draw connections between individual regimes.
Private governance institutions offer fluid links between state-based institutions,
with IOs serving as orchestrators. To date this literature still focuses on describ-
ing the dazzling array of governance arrangements within functional domains and
trying to account for their patterns and proliferation. It does not have a credible
account for which issues will be linked or by what policy instruments.
Constructivist analysis that focuses on actor networks and agency provides a
stronger causal argument as to which linkages will be forged, although it has less
to say about how those linkages will be institutionally organized at the international
level. Ernst B. Haas noted that the boundaries and nature of complex issues are so-
cially constructed: which issues are causally connected are not perceived “naturally”
but rather are the consequence of shared understandings by engaged political ac-
tors (Haas 1975). The prospects for linkage and the dynamics of linkage have to
do with shared normative and causal understandings (Haas 1980; Haas 2013). This
framework for understanding how complex wholes get organized in practice has
been fruitfully applied to the Sustainable Development Goals to explain patterns of
issue linkage (Haas and Stevens 2017). The epistemic communities’ literature pro-
vides a handle to explain how specific actors can contribute to issue aggregation via
processes of social learning (Haas 2015).
Finally, pragmatism offers a methodological and causal framework by which ana-
lysts, epistemic communities, and policy practitioners may exchange views and learn
from one another (Dewey 1929; Haas and Haas 2002; Bauer and Brighi 2009). It
provides a dynamic of change by which collective understanding by academics and
reflective experience by practitioners are combined and refined, and each group
learns from the other. Complexity poses the dominant problematique for contem-
porary IR that various theoretical approaches are trying to embrace. The most use-
ful approaches have invoked constructivist and institutional mechanisms to account
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Restricted Complexity: A Middle Path
between Postmodern Complexity Theory and
Positivist Mainstream IR
MA LT E BR O S I G
University of the Witwatersrand
This contribution brings the application of complexity approaches closer to main-
stream IR scholarship. While most of IR research does indeed explore complex phe-
nomena, complexity approaches remain grossly underused or are referred to as a
metaphor only. The main reason is very likely the perceived deep division between
the postmodern orientation of complexity approaches and the still scientific and
positivist orientation of much IR research (see above). However, these divisions are
less substantial than one might assume. A middle ground can be found in further
operationalizing the notion of restricted complexity, which combines elements from
the classical scientific approach as well as postmodern ones. It will be illustrated
using the example of the African security regime complex.
The argument for a middle ground position is built on the observation that, in
many cases, the empirical phenomena of interest are neither fully on the side of
the postmodern complexity approach, with its emphasis on nonlinearity and emer-
gence, nor fully on the side of clearly identifiable causal relationships in the original
scientific understanding. The questions of what brings peace, democracy, or devel-
opment are good examples of the in-between location research is often placed in.
While we know many causally relevant conditions that bring peace, development,
or democracy, research has largely failed to produce an applicable parsimonious
universal formula for it. Although the instruments for peacebuilding are widely
discussed and tested, the same instrument applied to different conflicts does not
necessarily wield to the same outcome (de Coning 2018). This poses a challenge for
both the nonlinear framework favored by postmodern complexity approaches and
the positivist research of mainstream IR. Neither will the search for single causes of
a complex phenomenon deliver better theories, nor can the fundamental neglect
of existing causal relations provide a comprehensive understanding of a research
puzzle. Mainstream IR scholarship continues the search for causal relations in or-
der to contribute to theory building, but this takes place in an environment that is
rightly perceived to be of increasing complexity.
On the one hand, we can hardly reduce social relations to a single or a few par-
simonious variables and place them in a deterministic cause-effect relationship in
order to build robust theories from these observations. On the other hand, concep-
tualizing IR as principally consisting of nonlinear relationships in which actorness
is only to be found in the system which is self-organizing and in which no predic-
tion over causal relations can be made does not fully match the empirical world. IR
can barely be assumed to be completely free from strategic behavior and hierarchi-
cal authority, for example, which rests on the assumption that actors as such have
ontological bearing and that certain interests and properties they encompass have
causal consequences (see, for example, the literature on rising powers).
If linear thinking and complexity are placed in the two opposing camps of
positivist and postpositivist orientations, they are easily identified as simply incom-
mensurate approaches with essentially different epistemological foundations: sepa-
rating explanation from understanding. However, such a separation is rather artifi-
cial. Elements of the linear model can be found in complexity approaches. Even
complexity theorists who are fundamentally postmodern in orientation, such as
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Newtonian science” but question its universal application. Causality and hierarchy
do exist in complexity approaches but have seldom taken center stage for com-
plexity theorists as they aimed at being distinct from the traditional linear scientific
approach. Causality is still understood as a cause-effect relationship but is nonde-
terministic and multidirectional. Complex systems produce “multiple but limited
sets of possible futures” (Byrne and Callaghan 2014, 176). In this regard they are
causally relevant. Complex systems are also assumed to operate and interact with
their broader environment, which is not a priori another complex system. If com-
plex systems adapt to their noncomplex environment, they can be a product of
linear processes. The idea that complex systems consist of recurring patterns of in-
teraction (feedback loops) also indicates that traces of causal and linear influence
can be found even within such systems (Cilliers 1998, 6).
Lastly, complexity approaches often argue that the system properties are not just
the result of a simple addition of its parts. This is true especially in relation to key
concepts of the theory such as self-organization, emergence, and nonlinearity. But
the system cannot exist without its parts (Morin 2007, 7–8). To some degree, the
constituent parts within a complex system are treated as nonreducible entities. They
simply do exist. However, the important argument is made that our knowledge of
these constituent actors is either incomplete or trivial outside of complex systems.
Neither can we understand the system without its parts, nor should we aim at sep-
arating the parts from the system. In such a relationship, causality exists but not in
the classical linear scientific understanding that treats the cause separate from the
effect.
Situations in which the effect impacts on the cause are known as endogeneity
and are usually seen as problematic and compromising the search for cause-effect
relations. However, within social sciences we should critically ask if universally ap-
plicable deterministic independent variables do exist, and if they do not, what is
framing their effects? Most likely we may find that they operate within a social con-
text from which they are difficult to separate completely. However, it does not follow
from this fundamental observation that the search for causality is generally fruitless.
In sum, complexity approaches, even when understood as postmodern approaches
are using many elements from the linear school. In the end, it is more a mixture of
the positivist and postpositivist schools of thinking than an exclusive represention
of only either side.
From a pragmatic perspective, then, how can IR research engage complex social
phenomena using key concepts of complexity? While there are good reasons to as-
sume that traditional linear scientific approaches are often too reductionist when
exploring complex social phenomena (Jackson 2011), it is also true, according to
some authors, that in IR few examples fully fit the postmodern notion of a complex
system as described by Cilliers (1998). We are rather confronted with semicomplex
issues in which, for example, strategic behavior is played out in a complex environ-
ment.
Complexity research has been understood by some as a middle way between more
linear positivist approaches and the postpositivist school (Geyer 2003, 244). The no-
tion of restricted complexity is particularly useful in this context because it can be
placed between complex and linear systems. It was first introduced by Morin (2007)
in contrast to the notion of general complexity, which he saw as remaining within
the realm of classical science. Although recognizing complexity, it decomplexifies it
(Morin 2007, 6). Operationalizing the notion of restricted complexity can help cre-
ate a tool for research occupying the middle ground between an ideal type of fully
complex systems and a more classical understanding of linear order. In this under-
standing, restricted complexity operates within a broader nexus between complex
approaches and a noncomplex (simple) system. Most IR scholarship is likely to pop-
ulate an extended space between the two antipodes. Key characteristics of restricted
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Table 1. Comparing systems
Complex systems Restricted complexity Linear systems
Open system Semi-open system Closed system
Nonlinearity Multiple causality Linearity
Self-organization Dispersed authority Centralized authority
Instead of having a fully open or completely closed system, we are more likely to
be confronted with a semi-open system. In such systems, we can identify politically
relevant actors to an issue, be they parties, states, IOs, NGOs, etc. However, we may
not know beforehand which actors are involved and how. Yet, for analytical pur-
poses it does make a difference whether we are confronted with a limited but large
number of actors or a principally unknown or infinite number of them.
Instead of having a system that is nonlinear or linear, we are more likely to be
confronted with issues of equifinality (see also introduction to this forum). Equifi-
nality cannot be reconciled with a deterministic understanding of causality, but it
still describes causal relations within a scientific framework, such as that of qualita-
tive comparative analysis in the form of necessary and sufficient conditions (Rihoux
and Ragin 2009).
Instead of understanding order as a form of self-organization or centralized au-
thority, the concept of restricted complexity offers a richer middle path. Dispersed
authority links up with the notion of governance without government. A rich lit-
erature on global governance, regime complexity, and overlapping institutionalism
already operates with a notion of dispersed authority (Brosig 2013; Orsini et al.
2013; Alter and Raustiala 2018).
While the terms open or closed systems, linearity or nonlinearity, and self-
organization and centralized authority describe either/or pairs of relations,
restricted complexity should better be understood as covering the broad area be-
tween complex and linear systems. There is ample space for various forms of systems
within restricted complexity. It does not define a particular type of organization at
the exclusion of another. Thus, we need to explore those conditions that frame re-
stricted complexity. The following paragraphs elaborate scope conditions or demar-
cation markers linked to semi-openness of the system, the issue of multiple causality,
and dispersed authority.
Semi-open systems are those systems that operate with a large but limited number
of actors. There are at least three demarcation markers for semi-open systems. First
semi-open systems may be large and consist of many actors but can be delimited
in terms of their reach or the geographical space in which they operate. In princi-
ple, no social system is infinite or completely borderless, but it might entail a high
number of actors and issues, which compromises the search for simple solutions to
an issue. Second, the semi-openness of the system may also depend on the degree
to which the issue the system addresses is linked with other issues. Thus, to which
extent can we observe a functional linkage with other (policy) areas? These linkages
extend the range of the system but are not infinite. Third, systems are semi-open
because the capacity of actors to engage in consequential ways with the issue is lim-
ited. The existence of many actors does not necessarily mean they are relevant for
the system if they are lacking the critical capacity to address the issue (policy area)
toward which the system is aligned.
In terms of multiple causality, the semi-openness of the system can also be linked
to the question of linearity. The more open a system, the less likely it becomes to
explore and detect causal relationships between actors. The wider the geograph-
ical space of operation and the more interconnected the issues, the less likely it
becomes to identify clear law-like causal relations. There is, however, a difference
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can be explored using a scientific approach; the former is largely incompatible with
it (Bennett and Elman 2006).
Dispersed authority is a nonhierarchical form of order, which is decentered
and thus can be placed between the hierarchical exertion of authority and self-
organization. Issues of global order are neither confronted with a world without
authority nor with a central managing body. Authority is dispersed in wide spaces in
cases in which it is overlapping (e.g., regime complexes) and in which hierarchies
are not immediately clear. Novel issues that have not been regulated before may also
fall under the category of dispersed authority, as it is not yet clear where authority
is located.
One example of how restricted complexity can be applied is research on regime
complexity and peacekeeping. It is ideally located at the crosslines between schol-
ars applying complexity theory (Brusset et al. 2016; Chandler 2016b; Kaufmann
2017) and mainstream IR, which tends to follow a more traditionalist approach to
research and causality. As such, regime complexity operates with a large number of
actors, the consequences of regime complexity are ambiguous (Alter and Meunier
2009), and regime complexes are decentralized forms of order (Orsini et al. 2013).
In other words, this literature does implicitly build on key tenets complexity the-
ory has prominently formulated. However, when taking a second look, it becomes
clear that regime complexity does not operate with an infinite number of interact-
ing regimes, that research has explored causal relations (Gehring and Oberthür
2009) and effects (Gehring and Faude 2013), and that order (governance) is a con-
sequence of system qualities as well as individual actors grouped together. In other
words, regime complexity occupies exactly the space that restricted complexity is
describing.
Let us provide a more concrete empirical example. The international response to
larger scale armed conflicts, especially in Africa, can be understood as constituting a
regime complex that often leads to the deployment of international peacekeeping
missions, among other instruments of conflict management (e.g., mediation, ob-
server missions, sanctions, etc.). This regime complex is characterized by the exis-
tence of numerous actors ranging from the United Nations to the African Union,
European Union, and various subregional African organizations (Brosig 2015). In-
ternational conflict response is not centered on a single actor any longer but dis-
persed among many. The constellation of actors varies from context to context but
usually involves a mix of regional and global IOs. Before a conflict breaks out, it is
not fully clear which IO will take what particular action. For example, the UN has
deployed missions following regional organizations, together with them, or sepa-
rate from them. However, the multiplicity of actors and the absence of clearly struc-
tured hierarchies or commonly accepted scripts for action does not mean the in-
ternational response is random or unstructured. In fact, we can observe a division
of labor following functional conditions in line with what population ecology has
formulated (Brosig 2014).
In other words, neither the conceptualization of regime complexity following a
postmodern understanding of complexity approaches as principally open systems
with a near infinite number of interconnected actors nor the static assumption of a
fixed number of actors with given properties following a scientific model of research
adequately captures the situation. The international response to armed conflicts
in the form of a regime complex can best be described as a semi-open system in
which many actors come together, which limits predictability and thus prevents the
building of theories on law-like assumptions. At the same time, the number of actors
is not infinite, and actors do follow certain scripts (interests, doctrines, capabilities),
meaning that a rational-choice approach can operationalize and be used to predict
some behavior.
Within the peacekeeping regime complex, actors do converge (Brosig 2013)
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operate in the same conflict area without having a previously agreed masterplan to
do so. Here, peacekeeping becomes the collective and spontaneously coordinated
response of a whole group of actors and is more than the individual response of
one alone. There is no central steering organ and thus authority is dispersed and
decentered. Out of this situation, IOs often set up so called International Contact
Groups (ICGs), which have taken on a light steering function. However, the decen-
tered character of ICG authority does not fully equal self-organization because the
former implies shared authority, while the latter does not presume to analyze au-
thority that rests on single actorness or groups of them. Actors converge, but this
does not mean that they get fully absorbed into a self-organizing system. Instead
they do retain autonomy but a conditioned one with strong interdependence.
In the end, the short illustration of the security regime complex is well captured
by restricted complexity with its emphasis on semi-openness instead of a fully open
or closed system. It describes a situation of multiple causality, but not nonlinear-
ity or linear relations, where authority is rather decentered than centralized or fully
self-organized. The notion of restricted complexity was brought up and operational-
ized in order to map out a middle path. The analytical value of such a middle path
is apparent. The greatest value might be that research that does not fall neatly into
either category of fully postmodern complexity theory or the mainstream positivist
tradition in IR research is not forced to take sides. There is no point in exploring
complex empirical phenomena with a toolbox favoring actor-centered causality in
an artificially confined environment only to satisfy methodological concerns. There
is also no need to fully “convert” and apply postmodern complexity theory in sit-
uations in which actors are many but not infinite, where causality plays a role but
is not unidirectional, and in which emergence is not only a system function. Ide-
ally, the concept of restricted complexity works as a bridge allowing more tradition-
ally minded researchers to confidently use the terminology complexity theory has
developed, using the term not merely as a metaphor but as a valuable analytical
instrument. For those already working with complexity theory, this contribution
should be read as an encouragement to widen the applicability of their favored
approach. Complexity theory is more than a niche approach; it can enrich IR re-
search both at the meta- and midrange level by breaking old divides in thinking and
applied research.
Studying Global Governance as a Complex
System: A Network Perspective
PH I L I P P PAT T B E R G
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
OS C A R W I D E R B E R G
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
To say that contemporary global governance is complex is a commonplace. How-
ever, while complexity is frequently used as a qualitative description and metaphor,
few authors within IR have attempted to conceptualize and measure complexity
taking into account the perspective of complexity approaches. In this contribution,
we argue that global governance, as the overall system of rules and regulations per-
taining to world politics (see Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006), has the properties of a
complex system and should therefore be described and analyzed through the lens
of complexity approaches. In particular, we highlight the role of network analysis
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According to Young (1999, 11), global governance can be defined as the “com-
bined efforts of international and transnational regimes.” The empirical and con-
ceptual research agenda on global governance (for a more detailed conceptual dis-
cussion, see Dingwerth and Pattberg 2006) has followed this conceptualization in
focusing predominantly on international institutions and, to a less extent, transna-
tional institutions (see Pattberg 2012). The overwhelming majority of scholarship to
date has unfortunately studied isolated institutions or ideal-type approaches (such
as nonstate market-based governance, see Cashore 2002), without taking into ac-
count the increasingly congested nature of global governance and the many ex-
isting interactions and linkages among governance institutions (see Oberthür and
Gehring 2006; Biermann et al. 2009 for exceptions). However, if we take “com-
plex interdependence” (Keohane and Nye 1977) as our empirical starting point,
complexity theory seems to be a natural choice for understanding the increased
complexity of global governance, from climate change to the financial crisis.
A survey of articles published in Web of Science (WoS) investigates the use of
complexity-related concepts in IR. WoS’s journals pertaining to global governance
studies—that is, in the subdisciplines of IR, political science, government and law,
and public administration—and their corresponding articles (745,998 items in to-
tal)1 were searched for the words “complexity” or “complex systems” in the title,
abstract, author keywords, or Keywords Plus® (a special WoS categorization), re-
sulting in 1,966 articles. Narrowing the data-set further by excluding articles using
the term “complexity” without mentioning “complex systems,” we found seventy-
four articles that included “complexity science,” “complexity theory,” and “complex
systems” in the abstracts, titles, and keywords. Considering the large number of ar-
ticles in the starting sample, this finding suggests that the number of articles using
complexity approaches in global governance is fairly limited.
The distribution of publication years in the sample shows that the use of complex-
ity approaches is a recent phenomenon in global governance studies. Whereas the
earliest mention of complexity in the dataset is an article from 1982 on forecasting
international crises in the Journal of Conflict Resolution, only ten articles were pub-
lished before 2006, meaning that over 85 percent of all articles in the sample have
been published in the last ten years. Furthermore, examining the distribution of
journals and authorship, there is no indication of a “community” of scholars using
complexity science or theory in global governance studies. The seventy-four articles
were published in fifty different journals, with fifteen journals containing more
than one article on complexity, and written by one hundred different people, of
which twenty-four articles include female (co-)authors (e.g., Ruth and Coelho 2007;
Brachthauser 2011; Cudworth and Hobden 2013; Meissner and Jacobs 2016), with
only ten people (co)-authoring more than one article. As Bousquet and Curtis
(2011, 44) have aptly phrased it: complexity theory “continues to stubbornly remain
on the margins” of IR theorizing.
While the overall impact on the discipline of IR is limited, ideas emerging from
complexity science have influenced IR and global governance scholarship along
two lines of inquiry: governing complexity (i.e., governance that is appropriate to
deal with complex problems) and the complexity of governance (i.e., the com-
plex interaction and interplay among institutions within and across policy-fields).
Related to the first usage, debates about adaptive governance and resilience use
complexity as a key concept (see Duit et al. 2010). New forms of governance, in-
cluding transnational institutions, are seen as a reaction to more complex prob-
lems and more interactions among causes and effects. This line of inquiry is inter-
ested in governance as a reaction to complex change. In the words of the editors
of a special issue for Global Environmental Change: “A central question is whether
there are certain forms of governance that are better equipped for addressing and
1
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managing processes characterized by complex change?” (Duit et al. 2010, 366). The
same reasoning can be found in Young’s recent book (Young 2017). In sum, a suit-
able description of this research line would be: governing complexity.
The second line of reasoning is concerned with the complex interactions of mul-
tiple institutions within and across a policy field; in short, the complexity of governance
and governing itself are at the center of attention. On this topic, scholarship has
been surprisingly silent to date. In the next section, we will therefore discuss how the
notion of complex systems can be operationalized to help scrutinize the complex-
ity of global governance with the help of network perspectives. Referring to Page
(2015, 24), complexity can be understood as DEEEP: difficult to explain, evolve,
engineer, or predict. The complexity of complex systems derives from the relation-
ships among constituent parts, not from the parts themselves. In other words, com-
plex systems are complex because of the interactions of their components and not
because of additive effects of all parts. It is therefore not sufficient to map all gover-
nance institutions in a given issue area in order to deduce outcomes (the standard
approach of regime theory) because interactions among constituent parts result
in system-wide emergent properties such as social learning and adaptive behavior
(see introduction to this forum). How then can global governance be studied as
complex systems? A short-hand answer is: by taking nonlinearity seriously as a key
characteristic of complex systems.
Networks are a perfect embodiment of nonlinearity. We contend that network
approaches and relational ontologies (Emirbayer 1997) will feature prominently as
analytical tools to unravel complex systems (Watts and Strogatz 1998). In the words
of Capra (1996, 82): “The first and most obvious property of any network is its non-
linearity—it goes in all directions.” Networks as a specific mode of organization
(as opposed to markets and hierarchies) have been recognized in IR and global
governance scholarship for a while. Examples include Keck and Sikkink’s concept of
transnational activist networks (1998) and Slaughter’s (2017) recent work arguing
that we should change our entire perspective of international politics, moving from
a “chess board” to a “web” view.
Network analysis as a formal method of inquiry has been applied less frequently,
however. This is rather regrettable, as network analysis allows for fine-grained but
robust measurements of structure (e.g., interactions among institutions in the
climate change regime complex). Network analysis is grounded in three princi-
ples that make it an ideal approach within complexity science (Hafner-Burton,
Kahler, and Montgomery 2009, 562): first, nodes (i.e., agents) are behaviorally
interdependent; second, ties between nodes can be channels for resource exchange
(material and nonmaterial); and third, repeated and persistent patterns of interac-
tion among nodes create structures that exert influence on the behavior of agents.
In a networked world, it is the position in the network that determines the poten-
tial to influence outcomes, not the individual attributes of agents. Hence, to rule
in a networked world, one needs tools for appreciating one’s position in the net-
work. Network science and network analysis offers a toolbox of various metrics and
methods for navigating networks at the local, regional, and global level. At the lo-
cal level, centrality measures such as betweenness centrality and degree centrality
indicate the importance of a single node vis-à-vis other nodes. At the regional level,
studying clusters could say something about nodes that tend to form linkages with
each other. At the global level, the network topology says something about the over-
all connectivity of the network, allowing for comparison across various networks.
Most of these approaches are developed in disciplines far from IR, such as physics
and mathematics, but have turned out to hold true for other disciplines as well. The
next step is to introduce it more systematically to the study of global governance.
How can this type of thinking help analyze global governance? What insight do
we gain from applying complex systems perspective? We argue that a complex sys-
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First, complex systems consist of entities. We can operationalize diverse entities as
different actors’ types (e.g., public, profit, nonprofit). Data from the domain of
global forest governance shows that next to governments, the issue-area is governed
by IOs, cities, companies, investors, and nonprofit organizations. A total of 6,239
organizations are active in the global forest governance domain (Pattberg, Kris-
tensen, and Widerberg, 2018). Second, in complex systems, entities interact with
each other. For global forest governance, we have checked whether entities are in-
teracting with each other by performing a network analysis of overlapping mem-
bership in global governance institutions (a network is then created among insti-
tutions within and across issue areas for those that share a member). By projecting
the two-mode network of institutions and their members to a one-mode network
of institutions, we find that only four institutions out of eighty-four are so called
“isolates,” meaning that they do not share a single member with another institu-
tion. Consequently, institutions in the global forestry governance complex form a
tightly knit network in terms of overlapping membership. This in turn suggests that
the likelihood of ideas, knowledge, and information spreading across the institu-
tions increases compared to a random network with similar numbers of nodes and
edges.
Third, complex governance systems show self-organization. Far from resulting
in overlaps and conflicts, governance systems display functional differentiation of
tasks and instruments. Data from the global forest governance domain show that
next to setting standards and commitments, financing, operating and networking,
and information-sharing are also performed as dominant functions (Pattberg, Kris-
tensen and Widerberg, 2018).
Studying governance systems (aggregations of regulations, institutions, rules,
norms, and decision-making procedures) as complex systems has a number of im-
portant implications. First, instead of focusing on individual institutions, attention
is directed toward interactions and interconnections—that is, the physical/social
nexus between governance approaches. Second, evaluating global governance
systems needs to take into account the complexity of the system—that is, system
level performance is not the same as additive performance. And third, because
learning, adaptation, self-organization, and feedbacks play important roles in
complex systems, we need to critically rethink assumptions about top-down steering
and “orchestrating” governance.
The Evolution of Governance Systems: The
Case of the Trade Regime
JE A N-FR É D É R I C MO R I N
Université Laval
LA U R A GO M E Z-ME R A
University of Miami
The international trade regime has undergone a remarkable and unexpected trans-
formation in recent decades. Studying the trade regime helps shed light on how
complex systems evolve at the international level. While Article XXIV of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) authorized preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) under certain circumstances, the latter were viewed as rare exceptions to
multilateral liberalization. Yet, since the creation of the World Trade Organization
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ments have been signed. In addition, PTAs are now more far reaching. Some recent
agreements include provisions on a variety of issues, such as investment, competi-
tion policy, intellectual property and the environment. As a result, the international
trade regime now overlaps with several other bodies of international law that were
previously quite distinct.
In the early 1980s, scholars started considering trade institutions as a regime
(Finalyzson and Zacher 1981; Ruggie 1982). The trade regime was recognized as
being “complicated,” given the nuanced rules, which were difficult to interpret and
apply. The early literature typically focused on the exogenous conditions necessary
to create and maintain the trade regime, such as the active investment of a benevo-
lent hegemon. However, early studies on the trade regime assumed it was inert and
largely overlooked its complex endogenous dynamics.
Theoretical developments in the IR scholarship on regimes (Raustiala and Victor,
2004) were gradually reflected in research on the global governance of trade. Thus,
the existence of interactions and overlaps among a growing number of trade insti-
tutions began to be acknowledged. Some studies explain the recent proliferation
of trade agreements in reference to “contagion” and the effects of competition be-
tween countries (e.g., Egger and Larch 2008; Baccini and Dür 2012). Others focus
on the legal content of trade agreements, by examining how specific treaty charac-
teristics are diffused across the network of trade agreements (e.g., Horn, Mavroidis,
and Sapir 2010; Milewicz et al. 2016). A third stream of literature examines the inter-
actions between bilateral, regional, and multilateral trade agreements (e.g., Davis
2009; Gómez-Mera and Molinari 2014; Gómez-Mera 2015; Brandi 2017). Finally,
scholars have studied the consequences of the overlap between trade and nontrade
institutions (e.g., Jinnah 2011; Carneiro 2014; Morin and Orsini 2014).
Despite the growing interest in interactions among trade institutions, few studies
approach the trade regime as a complex system.2 Much of the literature on the
trade regime remains conspicuously agent-centric and ignores system effects. Even
studies that use the concept of “complexity” to analyze the governance of trade
focus on how overlap and density constrain and shape the strategies adopted by
trade negotiators (Davis 2009; Meunier and Morin 2014). Little attention has been
paid to the many unexpected consequences of the interactions and their effects
on the evolution of the trade regime itself. While the focus on agency is extremely
valuable for understanding the governance of trade, it leaves some important—
more holistic—questions unanswered.
Is the trade regime a complex system? The introduction to this forum argues that
a complex system displays four characteristics: it includes multiple units of various
types, these units are intricately interconnected, they operate at different levels, and
they constitute a system that is open to its external environment. The trade regime
has all four characteristics.
First, the trade regime is made up of elements of various types. It includes WTO
multilateral agreements and hundreds of PTAs (Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014). The
scope of these agreements varies in terms of the depth of economic integration.
They can be partial, for example, when arrangements are limited to a specific in-
dustrial sector, or comprehensive, which is the case for common markets that share
a single currency and common regulatory bodies. PTAs also vary in terms of their
level of institutionalization. Some rely on intergovernmental arrangements, while
others delegate competencies to supranational agents. A multitude of government
officials, businesses, and civil society actors interact through and around these insti-
tutions.
Second, these elements are deeply interconnected and interdependent. Trade
institutions are held together by a shared set of liberal principles and objectives,
which were first laid out in the GATT of 1947. When compared, trade agreements
2
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Figure 1. Evolution of the PTA Network Structure.
Source: Authors, with data from Dür, Baccini, and Elsig 2014
present a degree of coherence, despite significant differences in their design and
their impressive proliferation. This is largely the result of dense social and political
links among the elements in the system (Wolfe 2005; Pauwelyn and Alschner 2014).
For example, Solis, Stallings, and Katada (2009) argue that policy emulation among
like-minded elites contributed to the spread of trade agreements in the Pacific Rim.
These trade agreements are linked and have formed a network structure. Figure 1






/isr/article/22/4/1008/5319218 by Vrije U
niversiteit Am
sterdam
 user on 22 D
ecem
ber 2020
FORUM: COMPLEX SYSTEMS AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 1025
each connection represents a PTA between countries. Research has revealed that
this evolving network structure influences the ways in which countries interpret
existing agreements and negotiate new ones. According to Lee and Bai (2013),
“transitivity” and “homophily” dynamics in the network of trade agreements explain
why countries tend to join PTAs.
Third, the structure of the trade regime has multiple levels. The actors and in-
stitutions in the trade regime occupy a series of interrelated levels—multilateral,
regional, and bilateral. In addition to this geographical structure, a legal structure
differentiates among macro principles, meso norms, and micro rules. The dynamics
at one level, such as proliferation, competition, diffusion, innovation, or concentra-
tion, affect the dynamics at different levels of organization (Kim and Manger 2017).
This applies to both the geographic and legal scale. For example, competition be-
tween two regional blocs might favor the proliferation of bilateral agreements con-
cluded by the two blocs with third countries. Likewise, the competition between
alternative norms, setting out how science should inform trade policy, can lead to
the proliferation of detailed rules governing sanitary restrictions on food products.
Finally, the trade regime is open to its environment and interacts intensively with
other systems. One prominent example is the gradual imbrication of the trade and
investment regimes. As Puig (2014, 493) states, “What had been relatively clear dis-
tinct regimes are now blurring, forming an emerging international economic law
‘regime complex.’” With the convergence of the trade and investment regimes, the
public and private enforcement of international economic law has become increas-
ingly entangled. Recent trade agreements contain “hybrids” of public and private
enforcement, allowing multiple actors to “interact within complex ecologies of ad-
judication.” (Puig 2014, 493) In this sense, the trade governance system (including
PTAs linked by partly overlapping membership) coevolves with the broader global
economic system (including firms linked by various types of transaction and owner-
ship). Positive feedback between the system of governing institutions and the system
of governed actors increases returns and stimulates their respective growth.
The trade regime also displays the three properties of complex systems identi-
fied in the introduction, namely self-organization, emergence, and adaptation. The
trade regime is a self-organizing system. The wide range of actors and institutions in-
volved in trade governance interact without any central hierarchical coordination.
While the WTO plays a certain orchestrating role, it remains a “member-driven” or-
ganization. The rules governing trade relations emerge from negotiations between
governments, often with input from private and technical actors. The governments
do not even notify the WTO systematically of their PTAs, despite the requirements
of the GATT Article XXIV (Mavroidis 2011).
The second property of complex systems, emergence, refers to the unexpected
systemic outcomes resulting from the interactions between the units in the system.
The trade regime has directly contributed to the emergence of economic global-
ization, a feature that is not only greater but also different than the sum of the
parts of the trade regime. The depth of integration and interdependence achieved
over the past seventy years would have been hard to envisage in 1947, when the
GATT was concluded. Yet, by reducing national trade barriers, the GATT and the
first PTAs have had an important impact on the nature of international produc-
tion, as well as investment patterns (Orefice and Rocha 2014). They have led to the
contemporary increase in the trade in services, the growth in investment flows, the
development of intra-industry and intrafirm trade, the creation of complex chains
of suppliers, and the expansion of transnational firms. These radical transforma-
tions are so profound that new measurements and concepts are required to make
sense of the emerging trade realities. For example, most experts now consider that
the notion of “trade surplus” is an obsolete measure of national economic perfor-
mance, whereas the concept of “global value chains” now reflects the need to mod-
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These shifting patterns in international trade have led to adaptive reactions in
the trade regime, the third property of complex systems. The early multilateral
and regional trade agreements primarily focused on the exchange of market ac-
cess and facilitating the exchange of end products. These agreements generated
a significant expansion in trade. In turn, this has created new incentives and ad-
ditional regulatory pressures—a feedback loop—with implications for the coordi-
nation and harmonization of various behind-the-border rules. In response to this,
recent PTAs provide a much deeper level of integration, with detailed chapters on
service liberalization, regulatory cooperation, labor mobility, telecommunications,
competition policy, financial regulations, intellectual property, investment protec-
tion and public procurement. It is clear that the number and scope of recent
PTAs go far beyond what was anticipated when Article XXIV was drafted in 1947
(Chase 2006).
These properties—self-organization, emergence, and adaptation—create en-
dogenous dynamics. One key insight of complexity theory is that complex systems
evolve at the edge of order and chaos. As mentioned in the introduction to this fo-
rum, reinforcing positive feedback makes complex systems particularly sensitive to
their initial conditions. Joost Pauwelyn provides examples of such path dependency
in the trade regime. He states that the initial articulation of “national treatment”
and the old notion of “fair and equitable treatment of foreign investors” have be-
come the dominant standard in international economic law. He goes on to explain
that network externalities favor these standards over newly introduced clauses, even
when alternative clauses are clearly more suitable (2014, 414). However, complex
systems also have negative feedback loops. Unexpected trade disputes, disguised
trade restrictions and social contestation have all contributed to the introduction
of additional safeguards in trade agreements, notably with regard to investment lib-
eralization and environmental protection (Morin and Gagné 2007; Morin, Pauwe-
lyn, and Hollway 2017). This combination of positive and negative feedback makes
complex systems unstable and makes it impossible to predict exactly how they will
evolve.
When it comes to analyzing the trade regime, the only reasonable prediction that
complexity theory can provide is that endogenous negative and positive feedback
will continue to make the trade regime increasingly more complex. Complexity
theorist Stuart Kauffman believes that complex systems have the propensity to grow
endogenously in their complexity. He suggests that this feature could be a candidate
fourth law of thermodynamics (2000, 142). Although Kauffman is referring to the
biosphere, other complexity theorists have shown that governance systems display
similar autopoiesis: nonlinear interactions between existing elements generate new
elements, making the system more complex (Teubner 1993; Luhmann 1995).
In this perspective, complexity is a continuous not a dichotomous variable. Com-
plexity is often considered to be either present or absent in a system. However, it
can be conceived as a continuum and measured along various dimensions corre-
sponding to the characteristics of complex systems: the number and diversity of
units, the density of their interconnections, the multiplicity of scales, and the de-
gree of interactions with the external environment. Presumably, a certain threshold
is necessary on each of these dimensions for a system to be sufficiently complex to
exhibit the properties associated with complex systems—namely, self-organization,
emergence, and adaptation. However, even when the threshold is reached, complex
systems tend to continue to grow in complexity.
This is the case for the trade regime. It reached a threshold in the early 1990s
and has been exhibiting complexity properties since then. It was around that time
that trade institutions started to proliferate exponentially. They are also becom-
ing increasingly diverse, with the emergence of new institutional forms, such as
plurilateral sectoral agreements (e.g., the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement),
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regulatory agencies (e.g., the International Competition Network) and collabora-
tion between intergovernmental organizations (e.g., the Standards and Trade De-
velopment Facility). The trade regime has expanded geographically. A growing
number of countries are involved, through multilateral, intra- and extraregional
agreements, which have intensified the interconnections between trade institutions.
Finally, the trade regime continues to interact with other international regimes. And
as mentioned above, recent PTAs commonly include full-fledged chapters on non-
trade issues, such as environmental protection, labor standards, and human rights
(e.g., Horn, Mavroidis, and Sapir 2010; Bruhn 2014; Milewicz et al. 2016).
The claim that complex systems grow in complexity is not a deterministic predic-
tion but a probabilistic one. Rich ecosystems have turned into deserts and vibrant
cities have shrunk. Likewise, previous trade systems have collapsed, and the current
trade system is not immune to this risk. Yet, it is reasonable to expect that: the num-
ber of PTAs in force will increase, new institutional forms will emerge to regulate
supply chains, the WTO will continue to expand its membership, and the average
trade agreement will come to cover additional issue-areas, such as taxation or data
security.
The increasing complexity of complex systems and, more generally, their con-
stant evolution, encourage trade analysts to take the temporal dimension more se-
riously when it comes to studying trade institutions. While history is a dimension
that is absent from several disciplines, ranging from Newtonian mechanics to clas-
sical economics, it cannot be ignored in complex system analysis. Negotiating a
trade agreement in 2019 is difficult to compare with negotiating GATT in 1947.
Therefore, causal explanations and mechanisms may not be applicable in different
contexts. While it is illuminating to study and identify patterns in social and inter-
national dynamics, it is important to acknowledge contextual effects. Complexity
theory warns trade analysts against the relentless search for universal and timeless
causal explanations.
Another useful lesson for trade analysts is that the resilience of the trade regime
does not depend solely on the WTO. The trade regime is populated by hundreds
of institutions, which means that the fate of one institution does not determine the
evolution of the entire system. In fact, complexity theory suggests that units that are
not central can have disproportionate and unexpected effects through nonlinear
systemic change. Arguably, the 1957 Treaty of Rome and the 1992 North American
Free Trade Agreement had this kind of butterfly effect on the entire trade regime.
Instead of being overly concerned with the WTO stalemate, trade policy analysts
should examine whether the appropriate feedback mechanisms are in place to en-
sure that trade negotiators can learn continually from institutional experiments in
various parts of the world, at bilateral and regime levels.
In sum, complexity approaches provide a series of illuminating insights into
the evolutionary dynamics of the global governance of trade, complementing
traditional agent-centric IR approaches. The latter focus on actors’ incentives and
capabilities and, thus, cannot fully account for the features and patterns of evolu-
tion observed in trade institutions. Most of the trade regime’s expansion was driven
by state actors’ deliberate decisions. However, their choices have had significant
unintended consequences, which have led to unexpected outcomes. By consider-
ing the trade regime as an open, living system, composed of interdependent and
interacting elements and self-adjusting actors, complexity approaches can make
useful contributions. They reveal systemic reverberations, emergent properties,
and unexpected effects, thus, shedding new light on some aspects of the recent
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The Complexity of the Governance of
Climate Change
NE I L E. HA R R I S O N
The Sustainable Development Institute
RO B E RT GE Y E R
Lancaster University
The influence of human activities on the global atmosphere is “clear and growing”
and is anticipated to change local climates across the world with “severe, pervasive
and irreversible impacts for people and ecosystems” (Pachauri and Meyer 2014, v).
Under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC),
countries have accepted “common but differentiated responsibilities and respective
capabilities and their social and economic conditions” (UNFCCC 1992) to collec-
tively “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C
above pre-industrial levels” (UNFCCC 2016). Because the climate system is complex
and, despite extensive and long-term research, the exact nature of these impacts is
uncertain, governance of the social response is necessarily complex.
Due to its ubiquity, climate change suggests a global multilevel response. How-
ever, national governments and IR scholars continue to focus primarily on an inter-
governmental response. The most recent large-scale move in the intergovernmen-
tal politics of climate change, the Paris Agreement, is by some accounts “a political
success in climate negotiations and traditional state diplomacy” because the argu-
ments during the negotiations were sufficiently persuasive on the economic benefits
to induce cognitive change (Dimitrov 2016). It also offers a “new hope” for climate
governance because it institutes a “bottom-up” approach (Bodansky 2016).
There is little evidence that the political success in Paris will prevent dangerous
warming. For most developed countries this would require greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions reductions of up to 80 percent below 2005 levels. Achievement of such na-
tional targets volunteered as a result of the Paris Agreement depends on how firms,
municipalities, and individuals are persuaded to accept short-term economic costs
for a possible long-term benefit. While there is dispute over the changes that are re-
quired, for governments to enforce the necessary behavioral changes on organiza-
tions and individuals would appear to require massive intervention in the economy
and society, as technological innovation alone, even assuming effective diffusion of
innovations, will not suffice (Harrison and Mikler 2014). Avoiding dangerous cli-
mate change will require complete decarbonization of electricity production with
rapid expansion of electric energy production, costly decarbonization or eradica-
tion of liquid fuels, and substantial changes in land use (IPCC 2014). Such changes
may cause estimated losses of between 3 and 11 percent of global GDP per capita.
In addition, estimates of the cost and effectiveness of mitigative policies are highly
uncertain, preventing design of effective long-term policy trajectories.
Depending on nation-states is at best a partial strategy. Conventionally, states
choose their actions in the context of international norms and domestic political
and economic conditions and implement them from the top down. This assumes
that they will be willing and able to implement effective policies and to maintain
them over time. The weakness of this position was blatantly demonstrated by the
actions of President Trump, who removed the United States, the world’s second
largest emitter of GHGs, from the Agreement. In Paris the Obama Administration
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2025. According to President Trump, this was too costly and the science was un-
proven, so withdrawal was necessary “to fulfill my solemn duty to protect America
and its citizens.”3 In contrast, China enthused that the Paris Agreement “is fair and
just, comprehensive and balanced, highly ambitious, enduring and effective, and
with legally binding force.”4 Although it has made major environmental strides, it
still faces major implementation problems. Achieving its voluntary national emis-
sions reductions goals depends on implementation by relatively autonomous re-
gional governments and is fragmented, driven by local social, economic, and envi-
ronmental conditions.5 Some regions are in a “race to the bottom,” implementing
only the minimal changes permitted by Beijing (or less), while some cities (e.g.,
Shanghai) and regions are in a “race to the top.”
The “new hope” in the Paris Agreement is its rejection of enforceable national
targets and timetables in favor of a process that allows states to voluntarily set GHG
emissions reduction goals and their progress toward those goals. This process still
leaves the responsibility for meeting emissions goals at the state level, and many
states will choose to use authority in a top-down manner to elicit behaviors by or-
ganizations and individuals that will be effective in reaching the chosen emission
goals. As discussed below, a complexity perspective suggests that a distributed ap-
proach at all levels of social aggregation would be more effective at both meeting
mitigation targets and protecting human society.
For a system to be a complex adaptive system, it must have an environment to
which it must adapt (Mitchell 2009). Defining the system to be studied defines its
environment and vice versa. The environment within which the complex conflicts
of the Middle East develop includes the international political and security systems
but also the historical, religious, cultural, geographical, and resource differences
between the players. The true success of the UNFCCC process has been construc-
tion of an ideational environment within which complex local social systems may
choose their adaptive behaviors.
All significant social systems, from local to global, are complex but different from
the natural systems that are often used as exemplars (Boulton et al. 2015). While
governments exercise some authority that may simplify decision-making, they may
be unable to reduce complexity in the social system being administered (Innes and
Booher, 2010). This is because humans have a reflective social complexity that en-
ables them to switch between multiple identities as they adapt to changes in context
and sometimes to changes in the rules of the system that orders their interactions.
This level of complexity is amplified at the global level not only by the larger physical
and biological interactions but by the enormous diversity of human organizational
forms and competing interpretations, understandings, and norms on almost any is-
sue (Mitleton-Kelly, 2015). Thus, from a complexity perspective, the true benefit of
the Paris Agreement is not seen just in the decisions of nation-states—the “political
success”—but in the number of US states and cities that individually and collec-
tively affirmed the Paris goals after President Trump repudiated that agreement.
Twelve states representing 30 percent of the US population, 210 cities, and “[m]ore
than 1,000 U.S. governors, mayors, investors, universities, and companies joined
the ‘We Are Still In’ campaign, pledging to meet the goals of the Paris agreement”
(Nuccitelli 2017). These entities chose actions contrary to national preferences be-
cause of the ideational environment structured by the UNFCCC process.
Because both social and natural systems evolve, global governance is exception-
ally complex, and a political success in intergovernmental negotiations is entirely
inadequate. The problem is to manage the coevolution of a global social system
3
“Statement by President Trump on the Paris Climate Accords,” WhiteHouse.gov, June 1, 2017, accessed April 1,
2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/statement-president-trump-paris-climate-accord/.
4
China’s Closing Statement at COP21, December 12, 2015, quoted in Dimitrov 2016.
5
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and the climate so as to avoid dangerous changes in global and local climates. Sim-
ply put, while we are changing the climate, we must adapt our lives to reduce those
changes and at the same time adapt to them as they occur. Effective mitigation to
achieve global goals set at Paris is most likely to emerge partly from national re-
sponses but perhaps more from local choices within the ideational environment
that it represents. However, adaptation to climatic changes must emerge locally in
response to local conditions and resource constraints.
Adaptations by complex social systems may or may not be effective. A social system
that is successfully able “to adapt or even transform into new development pathways
in the face of dynamic change” is said to be “resilient” (Folke 2016). Resilient social
systems adapt to climate change by reducing their net GHG emissions to mitigate
global warming and by conserving essential physical, social, and cultural infrastruc-
ture in the face of climatic changes as they occur. Social system actions may also be
maladaptive, reducing resilience, leading to system collapse despite the significant
expenditure of energy and resources (Tainter 1988). The difficulty of designing
effective policies increases with the size and complexity of the social system and,
because both social systems and the climate are complex and dynamic, it is not pos-
sible to assure in advance that any adaptive effort by a social system will be effective.
Uncertainty, experimentation, and feedback loops are all part of the process.
Complexity has clear linkages to elements of pragmatist philosophy (Ansell and
Geyer 2016) and the debates on governance and policy (Duit and Galaz 2008).
Both complexity thinking and pragmatism stress the importance of “evolutionary
learning” and “democratic experimentalism” (Ansell 2011, 5) and the need for
caution and avoiding hubris when attempting to govern complex systems. Com-
plexity and governance (or multilevel governance) share the idea that for most is-
sues there is no central controlling government. Instead, governance takes place,
“through processes and institutions operating at, and between, varieties of geo-
graphical and organizational scales involving a range of actors with different forms
of authority” (Duit and Galaz 2008, 318). In considering how to intervene in com-
plex collectivities—to modify norms, rules, institutions, or practices—governance
actions must recognize that the past does not foretell the future, that unintended
consequences may be significant, and that, therefore, the system cannot be firmly,
or hardly, “managed” to a desired future state.
An example of one of the tools of pragmatic complex governance would be the
use of “catalytic probes”—small scale, low risk experiments intended to elicit infor-
mation about system response—in order to find small interventions that may cause
large scale, positive changes in a system. Each probe into a local social system is a so-
ciopolitical intervention that tests its behavioral response and the consequent emis-
sions reductions in search of an effective contribution to the Paris goals. Spurred by
the ideational environment constructed by the UNFCCC and IPCC reports, many
regional, state, or local mitigation and adaptation processes have emerged across
the United States (Lutsey and Sperling 2008) and around the world (Bulkeley and
Castan Broto 2014). By their nature, the probability that such localized probes
would unintentionally cause large negative changes in social or natural systems is
minimal. In contrast, the risks of geoengineering the complex global climate are,
from a complexity perspective, orders of magnitude greater.
Adaptation to changing climatic conditions inevitably occurs locally, subject to
changes in local climates, and may be behavioral or physical (UNFCCC 2016). For
example, New York and New Orleans may need physical protection from sea level
rise and hurricanes. Because farming states in the US Midwest are threatened by
prolonged droughts punctuated by serious flooding, behavioral change in farm-
ing practices is slowly emerging that reduces emissions and protects productiv-
ity (Tabuchi 2017). Elsewhere small-island states, for example, face an existential
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fully funded their inadequate promises through the UNFCCC financial mechanism
(Pickering, Jotzo, and Wood 2015).
Climate change is a potentially catastrophic, nonlinear evolution of a complex
natural system caused by human activity. The mitigation of this human activity is
complicated by an international system that lacks a central government and where
state compliance with international rules and norms is now voluntary. States are
themselves more complex than usually accepted. Thus, if a complex system com-
prised of multiple complex subsystems can be expected to mitigate changes in a
complex natural system, governance processes that emerge across all scales of col-
lectivities need to be coordinated—a form of pragmatic complex multilevel gover-
nance. Complexity highlights the need for coevolution of states and between their
subsystems in terms of technical knowledge, and physical and financial resources.
From a complexity perspective, effective coevolution of global society with a non-
dangerous climate requires more than voluntary agreements among states. Indeed,
some states appear to be a major impediment. While this may not be true for all
issues, effective global climate governance and more resilient social systems can
emerge through action at lower levels of social aggregation than nation states. How-
ever, for this to occur resources will need to flow to the most promising local cat-
alytic probes. Thus, states are part of the problem as well as of the solution, and IR
theory and thinking must adapt accordingly. Nothing in complexity guarantees that
humanity will be able to create a sustainable response to this potentially cataclysmic
change, but progress to that end requires probing the workings of an approach bet-
ter suited to the challenge of global governance through global sharing of effective
local strategies and the distribution of resources across all sizes and types of social
systems.
Conclusion
DAV I D CH A N D L E R
University of Westminster
This forum starts by explaining that the problem posed by complexity is that it is
precisely contemporary developments in science and technology that appear to re-
veal the limitations of traditional frameworks of policy-making, which are reliant on
universal assumptions of cause-and-effect: “Paradoxically, as our tools to make sense
of and control societies and our environment increase, our ability to do so dimin-
ishes” (Introduction). The importance of complex systems analysis for international
governance is precisely that it seeks to enable governance in a world where the im-
pacts of policy-making seem much less predictable and contingent on unknown
variables of interaction. The contributions on the problems of climate change and
global warming emphasize that while not every question of the international may
be complex, the most pressing problems of our contemporary age are ones that
necessitate a serious engagement with complex systems of ecosocial interaction.
It is important, however, to realize that the science of the study of complex
problems—of emergent causality and of nonlinear effects—is in its infancy. It is
easy enough to deal with complex systems in the abstract, for example, by defining
the characteristics of a complex adaptive system or outlining the nested hierarchy of
interacting systems along the lines of Gunderson and Hollings’ “panarchy.” (2002)
It is much more difficult to deal with (and perhaps even to fully recognize) com-
plex systems in real life. Perhaps the key barrier in the field of IR, when addressing
the governance of complexity, is precisely the desire to “systematize” the analysis,
squeezing real life appearances into the abstract system theoretic frameworks. Even
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a complex system, especially if it is assumed that any interventions to impact one of
the variables may not have a similar impact if the contextual interactions with other
variables are constantly evolving. It seems highly likely that the reason complex sys-
tem analysis remains underrepresented in the IR field is that it can appear to lack a
concrete policy program beyond the advocacy of greater caution and humility and
a general sense of lowered expectations with regard to policy successes.
That said, there is little doubt that complex systems approaches have become
increasingly influential in the field, perhaps one could say, almost by default, as
policy-makers move away from traditional “top-down” policy understandings, seek-
ing to follow environmental and contextual “cues” rather than to impose a gov-
erning agenda on a world that seems to be growing in its intransigence. One first
indication of this shift is the increasing awareness of our entangled relation to policy
problems and threats—that is, that problems are not external to us but, like climate
change and global warming, are much closer to home. The less distinction is made
between the security referent (that which needs to be secured) and the perceived
security threat, the less relevant become the static systems analyses which seek to
secure system equilibrium. Thus, understanding complexity in terms of an applied
theory for scientific “problem-solving” misses precisely the point that separations
between governing actors and problems to be governed are much less obvious than
for traditional IR theorizing.
Recognizing that policy-actors are always and already in the middle of complex
systems of interaction, contributions by Peter Haas and Malte Brosig provide impor-
tant illustrations of how complex systems analysis contributes to managerial knowl-
edge, seeking sustainable solutions or the balance between competing normative
concerns. Here feedback loops and processes of interaction facilitate projects of
process-tracing, enabling the constitution of communities of concern and greater
contextual awareness. Management thereby becomes divorced from processes of
external or “top-down” control: complexity approaches increasingly place the the-
orist inside the problematic rather than outside, thus theorizing (and governing)
becomes a recursive or iterative learning process. One good example of the power
of complex systems analysis has been the response to Hurricane Katrina. As Ulrich
Beck argued (2015, 80), an awareness of the interactive and emergent causality of
complex systems meant that rather than seeing the flooding and its consequences as
being an arbitrary or external “act of Nature,” connections were made between en-
vironmental management, racial exclusion, and economic inequalities. This aware-
ness of interconnectivity and the unintentional side effects of previous actions then
provided the potential for recursively developing new policy approaches. Govern-
ing in complexity thereby becomes an ongoing process of responding to the (unin-
tended and unforeseen) effects of previous actions.
In the following essays, the importance of the complex systems approach for the
analysis of international governance is further drawn out. The examples of trade
and of climate change illustrate the growing appreciation of the gap between actor
intentionality and policy outcomes. Complexity approaches seek to overcome this
gap by making governance more process-like, essentially by bringing governance
closer to the problem. This approach can also be seen in many attempts to re-
spond, increasingly in real time, to problems in the international sphere—from
conflict to environmental crises, humanitarian emergencies, crime, and terrorism.
Here, it is suggested that rather than attempting to prevent problems before they
occur or merely reacting after the event is passed, awareness of complex systems
and emergent causality require a greater level of monitoring and sensitivity to see
problems and threats less as emergencies or sudden events but more as processes
that happen over time. In the humanitarian sphere, the study of complex processes
of interaction has meant that “slow-onset” emergencies are increasingly the focus of
attention, where multiple variables are used as indicators of community vulnerabil-
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down” by greater sensitivity to their emergence, especially through the use of new
digital and sensing technologies, which can pick up on ecosocial changes to enable
much more rapid responses to potential problems (Jacobsen 2015; Kaufmann 2017;
Hardt 2018).
In these frameworks, complex systems analysis enables policy-makers to take the
emphasis away from the linear and reductionist framings of preemptive “predic-
tion” and post hoc “solution.” Understanding problems and crises as emergent
processes has increasingly enabled governance to operate on the basis that prob-
lems cannot be effectively prevented or solved but that they can be managed in
order to ameliorate their effects. Policy framings, which seek to be more sen-
sitive to contexts and to changing relations, enable new ways of understanding
management at the level of the modulation of effects rather than addressing causes
(Chandler, 2016a).
Complex systems analysis thereby informs governance but without the modernist
assumptions of the capacity for causal knowledge and predictive possibilities. Thus,
new approaches focus upon the “what is” of the world, developing responsive and
sensing forms of real-time regulation (see Chandler 2016b, 405–6). This approach,
which attempts to grasp complex and plural forms of emergence, has been the
subject of several high-level international initiatives, involving the collaboration of
leading global agencies—examples include the World Bank’s Open Data for Re-
silience initiative (OpenDRI), seeking to track the impacts of climate change and
the emergence of natural hazards in real time; the PopTech and Rockefeller Foun-
dation initiatives on community resilience and big data; and the United Nations’
Global Pulse, established by the UN secretary-general to research and coordinate
the use of big data for development (Chandler 2016b, 406). These initiatives high-
light the many ways in which data-led understandings of adaptation are displacing
policy interventions based upon traditional understandings of linear causality.
This shift to the adaptive modulation of the status quo (often linked to discourses
of resilience and self-responsibilization) has been criticized for lowering transfor-
mative expectations and increasingly enabling states and international institutions
to affirm or to naturalize existing inequalities and incapacities (see, for example,
Chandler 2014; O’Malley 2011; Rose and Lentzos 2017; Duffield 2018). It seems
clear that much work needs to be done if a balance is to be struck to ensure that
complexity approaches do not become merely an apologia for lower expectations of
governing interventions. Nevertheless, the genie of complexity thinking cannot be
put back into the bottle and, as the contributions to this forum illustrate, complex
systems analysis has already become an important addition to the tool kit of inter-
national governance. At the very least, the understanding that we are all always and
already entangled in complex systems enables a range of new and innovative policy
responses that seek to be more reflective (and also more reflexive) with regard to
both contemporary and previous policy interventions as their consequences (both
intended and unintended) stick with us. This, in itself, is already of great potential
importance.
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